sighting of Early’s wagon train near Purcellville. Confederate cavalry under Brig. Gen. Bradley Johnson failed to screen Early’s northern flank, allowing a force of less than 300 Federals to capture 37 wagons and 54 prisoners, and to burn another 43 wagons. The loss of some wagons did not stop Early’s retreating army, though. By day’s end, his vanguard was in the Shenandoah Valley and the rest of Early’s army camped at Snicker’s Gap.

Battle of Cool Spring

(Refer to the Battle Maps, Pp. 61-64)

On the morning of July 17, 1864, Jubal Early completed his withdrawal into the Shenandoah Valley, establishing his headquarters at Berryville and deploying his troops throughout Clarke County to confront potential threats from multiple directions. Although Horatio Wright was supposedly in hot pursuit of the Confederates, he merely swiped at Early’s rear guard at Castleman’s Ferry (see Pg. 62) on the Shenandoah River with his cavalry, while the Federal infantry remained in camp. The effort accomplished nothing aside from alerting Early that Federals were nearby. Consequently, Early instructed his division commanders “to have his troops on the watch and make a most determined resistance if any attempt at a crossing was made,” and to have the troops “under arms at daylight.”

That evening Wright ordered Crook to depart for Snicker’s Gap with the Army of West Virginia at 4:00 a.m. on July 18 and “cross the river if practicable and attack.” The VI and XIX corps would march to Crook’s support from their camps near Clark’s Gap in the Catoctins west of Leesburg. Although Wright ordered an advance, that evening he assured Halleck in Washington, “I have no doubt that the enemy is in full retreat for Richmond.” Word of the low expectations filtered down through the officer corps. Col. Joseph Thoburn, leading a brigade in Crook’s command, noted in his diary that “but little is expected from our pursuit.” That Early would escape seemed a foregone conclusion to the Union commanders.6

Crook’s Army of West Virginia had seen hard service that spring and suffered greatly for want of food and supplies during its retreat from Lynchburg. The infantry division with him at Purcellville had numbered over 6,000 men a little more than a month earlier, but now counted only 3,500. “The men of the command are very badly used up,” lamented a surgeon, “many, very many will never recover from the great Hunter raid.”7

While Wright moved cautiously, Crook determined to do everything in his power to bring Jubal Early to bay. Although officially under Wright, Crook notified General Hunter that he “intended to move forward and attack the rebels at Snicker’s [also called Castleman’s] Ferry.” In response, Hunter dispatched a brigade from Harper’s Ferry to threaten Early’s northern flank in conjunction with Crook’s advance. The Army of West Virginia reached Snicker’s Gap at 9:00 a.m. and waited for the VI Corps to arrive.

From the heights of Snicker’s Gap, Crook scanned the valley below and watched the Confederates at the ford repulse an attempt by Union cavalry to cross the river. Crook decided that Brig. Gen. Alfred N. A. Duffié’s small cavalry division was not needed at Snicker’s Gap and sent him to Ashby’s Gap, nine miles south to get around Early’s right flank. This move had the unintended consequence of depriving the army of its eyes and ears, as well as limiting its ability to quickly probe the Confederate positions on the west side of the river.

The vanguard of the VI Corps reached Snickersville, at the eastern end of the gap, at 11:30 a.m., and Wright joined Crook on the bluff. Looking out from the eminence that towered almost 200 feet above the river, Crook’s keen eye explored the terrain seeking advantageous ground for his troops and an understanding of Confederate dispositions. However, Crook noted, “we could not tell whether they were in force or not,” so Wright ordered Crook “to send a force across the river and develop the enemy.”

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