Volume XXVI Issue #1 • An Excerpt From:


The Battle of The Bloody Angle,
or "Mule Shoe"

by Chris Mackowski and Kristopher D. White

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Note: All Blue & Gray feature articles are annotated.


Typical earthworks along the Mule Shoe. Combatants would fight hand to hand in the rain.

General Grant wrote in a letter to Washington on the morning of May 11, “We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.”9

Indeed, by referring to May 10 as the “sixth day” of fighting, Grant offered insight into his overall strategic view. The series of engagements that began on May 5 in the Wilderness was, in Grant’s mind, a single long conflict rather than separate battles. He intended to continue pushing.

His next intended target would be the tip of the salient, which, by its very nature, was the weakest spot in the Confederate line. He intended to hit it with a quick, powerful strike, similar to Upton’s. Rather than send just twelve regiments, though, Grant planned to send in Hancock’s entire II Corps. With 20,000 men, it was the largest corps in the Federal army.

While the II Corps attacked the tip of the salient, Grant’s plan called for Warren to push against the Confederate left near Laurel Hill, preventing Lee from shifting men from that part of the line to reinforce the center. Burnside’s IX Corps, positioned opposite the Confederate right, would push against the east face of the salient. Wright’s VI Corps would reinforce Union efforts wherever needed.

The idea was simple and it resembled the parameters Upton had put forward on May 10. The formation would be compact, with a tight two-division front aiming for the tip of the Mule Shoe. The first line would break open the Confederate position. To widen the breakthrough, one division could swing to the east and one to the west. The second wave could then secure the gap. Then the potential existed for Wright’s reinforcements to exploit the breakthrough. With Burnside and Warren putting pressure on the other fronts, Lee would have to retreat or face destruction of his center and possibly his army.

The attack would form near a home owned by John C. Brown, some three-quarters of a mile distant from the salient’s tip. Between lay plenty of open land that would afford the II Corps a relatively unencumbered approach to the Confederate position, yet a woodlot closer to the Brown house would allow the men to get into position under protective cover. To help preserve secrecy, Grant ordered the men to assemble under cover of darkness and for the attack to begin at 4:00 a.m.

Grant passed the orders on to Meade, who then went over them that afternoon with Hancock, Wright, and Warren. Burnside, acting as an independent command, received his orders directly from Grant: “You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at 4 o’clock tomorrow morning.”10 (See Map, Pp. 12-13.)

To be sure Lee was staying in place and not preparing an offensive of his own, Grant ordered a reconnaissance in force against the Confederate left flank. The subsequent probes by Col. Nelson A. Miles attracted Lee’s attention, who countered by shifting two brigades from Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early’s Third Corps on the Confederate right to reinforce the left. Grant’s staff also issued orders that afternoon to Burnside to adjust his poorly deployed lines along the Federal left. Burnside complied “at once without difficulty, but with some grumbling at the change.”11

At about that time, Confederate mapmaker Jedediah Hotchkiss was on an intelligence-gathering mission, observing the Federal left. He reported back to Lee that the poor configuration of Burnside’s line left the Federals “exposed to a flank movement.”12 Other reports suggested that Burnside’s wagons and infantry were on the move in an apparent withdrawal—which would explain why Burnside’s position was vulnerable, Lee reasoned. It appeared that Burnside was stripping his position, and the probes against the Confederate left had been intended to draw attention away from a Federal withdrawal. “Gradually,” wrote Campbell Brown of Ewell’s Second Corps staff, “the conviction spread that they were retiring towards Fredericksburg.”13

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