
|
Volume XXVII Issue #5 An Excerpt From:
by Henry P. Elliott Click Here to view a sample map from this article |
|
|
|
On the afternoon of June 1, 1861, Brig. Gen. Pierre Gustav Toutant Beauregard disembarked from the train at Manassas Junction. The hero of Fort Sumter had been in Virginia for a mere three days. He had received unexpected instructions to proceed to Richmond, the new capital of the Confederacy. There he met with President Jefferson Davis, himself a recent arrival to the city, and Maj. Gen. Robert E. Lee, commander of the state troops and acting commander of all Confederate forces in Virginia. Lee briefed both men on the strategic situation then unfolding near the states northern border, presenting the fledgling government with an immediate crisis. Union troops already had crossed the Potomac River and occupied Alexandria, and were beginning to probe into Fairfax County. Only a small makeshift Confederate force stood poised to confront them, several miles to the south behind a stream called Bull Run. Beyond this creek stood the Union armys next apparent military objective, Manassas Junction, the intersection of two major railroads. Davis needed an officer of proven reputation and public standing to defend this vital railroad hub. Beauregard would take command at the point of greatest concern. Manassas Junction by itself stood as a forgettable little stop on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, located near the community of Tudor Hall, later to become the city of Manassas. Located approximately 28 miles southwest of Washington, the junction took on great military significance in the summer of 1861. Even a cursory glance at a map of the Old Dominion revealed two areas of the state that appeared particularly vulnerable to Federal invasion. The most obvious route of advance for any Union army would be an overland march from Washington toward Richmond, during which they could take advantage of the Orange & Alexandria as a convenient conduit to transport troops and supplies into the heart of Virginia. Only a hundred miles separated the opposing capitals. Confederate leaders maintained an equal concern, however, for the Shenandoah Valley, which offered another avenue of invasion to the Federals. An enemy advance up the Valley (south) could utilize the Blue Ridge Mountains to screen their movements, before crossing the mountains and stealthily moving on Richmond from the northwest. There was a strong probability that Union forces would invade the state at both points. Facing the possibility of this two-front war on Virginias northern border, the Confederates would be forced to defend both regions. Failure to do so would undoubtedly result in a hasty retreat and demoralizing loss of territory, as a Federal force invading one unprotected region would quickly outflank any Confederate troops guarding the other. But the Confederates lacked sufficient manpower to defend both areas in the event of simultaneous invasions. They needed a means of shuttling troops rapidly between each location in order to quickly concentrate their available forces at the point and moment of crisis.
|