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Volume XXVI Issue #5 An Excerpt From:
by Gary Ecelbarger Click Here to view a sample map from this article |
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On April 19, 1862, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson entered the southern mouth of the Luray Valley by the road from Harrisonburg. His objective was to shelter his division from the threat of an attack by a much larger Union army commanded by Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks who had slowly penetrated deeper into the Shenandoah Valley since the victory by one of his divisions at the Battle of Kernstown one month earlier. Kernstown, the first battle of the campaign, represented the nadir of Stonewall Jacksons fortunes as an independent commander for the first 82 days of 1862. The abysmal and aborted winter campaign in northwestern Virginia in January and February, followed by the rout of his three infantry brigades at Kernstown on the first Sunday of spring, March 23, had stripped Jackson of four cannons and reduced his division to the size of a large brigade, with fewer than 3,000 infantrymen, horse soldiers, and artillerists.1 Jacksons reputation also suffered in the wake of these miserable three months. Stonewall had earned his nom de guerre and his high rank for his sterling defense on Henry House Hill during the Battle of Manassas the previous July. But after his unimpressive performance in the winter campaign, Jackson had caught the ire of his subordinates in a whispering campaign, and was mocked by his opponents aloud before and after his defeat at Kernstown. He was taunted by victorious Union troops at Kernstown as Stonewall Jackson for fleeing from the stone wall that ran through the middle of that battlefield. And even weeks before this, one of Abraham Lincolns secretaries was wholly unimpressed by Jackson and his leadership during the winter season of 1862, deriding him as a queer, thick-skulled, blundering honest dunce. Three weeks after the Kernstown battle, when Confederate President Jefferson Davis suggested that Jackson and his army be sent on an offensive in the Shenandoah Valley ostensibly as a means to have Union troops recalled from the Yorktown peninsula east of Richmond (or at least to prevent reinforcements from being sent to them), Davis top subordinatesincluding Gens. Robert E. Lee and Joseph E, Johnstonconsidered the suggestion impossible to be carried out by Jackson.2 The cold response to President Davis idea had less to do with Jacksons abilities and more to do with the disparate size of the opposing commands in the Shenandoah Valley. At the passing of the midpoint of April, Jacksons division had doubled in size compared to the tiny army that fled the Kernstown battlefield three weeks earlier; however, his 6,000 soldiers were only a third of the strength of General Banks Department of the Shenandoah. Jacksons numerical strength improved from the fruits of the 1861 Bounty and Furlough Act and from the 1862 Conscription Act, but he still did not have the numbers to compete with what Banks was throwing against him, so Jackson abandoned his camp at Rudes Hill just north of New Market, led his army southward through Harrisonburg, followed the southeast bend of the Keezletown Road, which outlined the southern peak of Massanutten Mountain, and passed through McGaheysville (pronounced Mi-GACK-eez-vil), the southernmost settlement of the Luray Valley. From there they continued on their way to Conrads Store.3 Page 1 Page 3 Order this issue
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