The following is the Letter from the Editor from the Little Bighorn Campaign issue, Volume 23, #2.


From the editor — Custer Could Have Won It

Make no mistake about it. This issue is about Civil War soldiers. They learned their craft in the Civil War and probably thought they had seen it all. They had not.

During the past few months, when asked by interested folks about future issues of the magazine, and I would say Custer and the Little Bighorn, I most often heard, “Isn’t it awful what we did to the Indians?”

My answer: Military history is essentially a record of winners and losers. The Indians won the battle but lost the war; Custer lost the battle, but his demise led to a more unified effort that won the war. Analyzing the U. S. government’s policy toward Indians, right or wrong, is beyond the scope of this issue, though there is mention of it. The approach here is mostly military. Besides, Indians had been killing Indians on this continent long before the white man got involved. Winning and losing in war was not new to the tribes.

Some things I learned about Indian fighting while putting this issue together:

(1) Never get captured by them. Actually, I already knew that, but after learning more details of the Fetterman Massacre, the carnage on Last Stand Hill, and other incidents, mutilations—and not necessarily after death—were brutal and gruesome, and part of the spirit religion practiced by the Indians. So save the last bullet for yourself.

(2) If you attack Indians, they will run; if you run from Indians, they will attack. You will see this reflected in the Maps. While soldiers are shown with typical directional arrows and battle lines, Indians are depicted as “swarming.” They generally fight independent of close supervision, every warrior for himself. But they do not like to take casualties. If an attack is aimed at them, they will move; when it moves away, they will return. But do not run from them. Marcus Reno did and lost half his men. Some think Reno could have held his position in the Little Bighorn valley for as long as he wanted, or needed.

(3) Indian warriors, as with any fighting force, prefer the tactical advantage of numbers. Crazy Horse’s attack at the Rosebud is a notable exception. They often use decoys, even “suicide boys,” to lure an enemy into an ambush. In striking an isolated force, they are ruthless.

(4) Similar to #2, Indians are almost always moving around, except in winter. If given the chance a whole village will scatter. The main concern of Custer during the campaign was catching the Indian camp by surprise, just as he had at the Washita, before they had a chance to pack up and leave. He succeeded in catching them napping at the Little Bighorn, even though he did not know it at first.

(5) Indians may have the strategic goal of ridding the region of you, but seldom go for the tactical kill toward achieving that objective. After the Fetterman Massacre they could have wiped out Fort Phil Kearny, but did not. After Custer’s demise on Last Stand Hill, they could have wiped out the Reno-Benteen force, if willing to accept casualties, but did not.

Neil Mangum believes victory was not impossible for Custer at the Little Bighorn. Sure, Custer was let down by his subordinates, but he also knew better than to make the mistakes he made—not from Indian War experience, from leading soldiers in battle during the Civil War.


editor