and warn of attack. The opposing forces had both strung telegraph lines to provide instant communications along the length of the armed corridor. Behind the Union entrenchments was a line of secondary works and the Military Railroad that brought supplies from City Point to the front lines several times a day (see Pg. 66).8

Given his limited resources, the venerable Lee had not attempted a major offensive (unless Grant struck first) since the protracted conflict at Petersburg had begun nine months ago. But Gordon immersed himself in the task. The brash Georgian considered every detail and contingency that would affect the outcome: any vulnerability of the enemy’s defenses, the time required to breach them, the distances between lines, the terrain, the hour of attack, and the available resources. Passable weather and dry ground were given elements of the plan.

Then, as now, reliable intelligence was of the utmost importance. Gordon wrote: “My efficient staff—Majors Moore, Hunter, Dabney, and Pace, and Captains Markoe, Wilmer, and Jones—were constantly engaged gathering information from every possible source.” The reports of his own units were augmented with interviews of enemy prisoners, deserters, and spies.9 Regarding the penetration by spies, Gordon tells of how Grant had chided Lee, through an emissary: “I keep in such close touch with him [Lee] that I know what he eats for breakfast every morning.” The indomitable Southern commander responded through the Union officer that, for his part, he knew “perhaps as much about his [Grant’s] dinners as he knew about my breakfasts.”10

While surveying the front near the Appomattox River, Gordon consulted with the commander of his First Division, Maj. Gen. James A. Walker. Walker recalled that Gordon took note of the short distance between the Confederate positions at Colquitt’s Salient and the Federal works on Hare’s Hill called Fort Stedman. Gordon inquired of Walker whether he was vulnerable to attack from Fort Stedman. Walker replied, “I did not think I could hold my position against an assault because the enemy’s lines were so close that they could clash over our works any night before we were aware of their coming. . . .” But Walker said the reverse was also true: “I can take their front line any morning before breakfast.” Gordon replied, “Don’t forget what you have said; I may call on you to make your words good.”11

Gordon reckoned that after a week of “laborious examination and intense thought,” his plan of attack was “fully developed in his own mind.” On March 22, Lee called a meeting with Gordon to determine whether he had found a weakness in the Federal defenses, and, if so, how he would exploit it. Gordon said that he told Lee: “I can take Fort Stedman, sir.”12


SCENE OF THE FIGHT

Fort Stedman stood on Hare’s Hill (see Pp. 62-63) located two miles east of the center of Petersburg and one mile south of the Appomattox River. The men of the 17th South Carolina claimed that they had built the original structure when Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan marched up the Peninsula to threaten Richmond in 1862.13 The fort lay on the second line of Confederate defenses that were overrun by Northern divisions during their attacks of June 15-18, 1864. Now turned to Federal use, it was named for Bvt. Brig. Gen. Griffin A. Stedman of the 11th Connecticut Volunteers and Martindale’s brigade. On August 5, 1864, Stedman was mortally wounded following a failed Confederate attempt to explode a mine there.14

Fort Stedman faced west toward Spring Hill where the Confederates manned the heavily fortified Colquitt’s Salient (see Pp. 62-64). Located only 200 yards from Fort Stedman, Colquitt’s Salient provided a strong base for staging an attack. Union Capt. William Hodgkins, who studied the fortifications of both sides and later wrote a book about the battle, recalled: “The batteries in and around this position mounted twenty guns of various calibers. A formidable triple row of cheveaux-de-frise protected it from assault. In rear was a road twenty feet wide, in a broad deep ravine. In great numbers troops could be massed; and the road was continued as a completely covered way as far as Blandford, a suburb of Petersburg.”15 To the rear, formidable Confederate artillery batteries occupied the high ground on both sides of the Appomattox River.16

In contrast, Fort Stedman, though formidable in appearance, was among the weakest links in the Federal line of defenses. The artillery officer of the U. S. IX Corps, Bvt. Brig. Gen. John C. Tidball, said that it “was no fort in the engineering sense of the term, but a struggling work of no regular shape.”17 Captain Hodgkins noted: “It was a comparatively small work without bastions, covering about three-quarters of an acre of ground. In the fort and around it, in rear, was a grove of large shade-trees. . . . Its nearness to the enemy prevented even the slightest repairs.”18 Nearness to the enemy also rendered it vulnerable to a surprise rush from the Southern lines.

North of Fort Stedman was Fort McGilvery, located near the Appomattox River. A line of breastworks extended southward from McGilvery through Union Batteries VIII and IX. The quarter-mile space between Fort Stedman and Battery IX was the most vulnerable point on the line. The ground sloped down to an open plain, low-lying and often wet. The men of the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery had suffered the worst single-action loss of any Civil War regiment in their ill-fated charge across this field on June 18, 1864.19 Constant picket fire from the enemy prevented completion of the Union works on this exposed site.

According to General Tidball, Fort Stedman, with Batteries X, XI and XII were “to all intents and purposes, one work.” Shielding Fort Stedman on the right, Battery X was “an open work” mounting two cannon and mortars. On the ridge to the left, Battery XI was a small, V-shaped “ravelin for two guns.” Beyond Battery XI a curtain extended to Battery XII, “a nearly square redoubt mounting four Coehorn mortars.” In front of Batteries XI and XII the ground fell down into shallow, creek-lined ravines. Sited on high ground one-half mile to the south of Fort Stedman was Fort Haskell (see Pp. 64-65), “a strong fortification mounting six guns, besides mortars.”

Captain Hodgkins noted: “The crest upon which Stedman stood was commanded in the immediate rear by two hills of nearly equal height—the Dunn House hill, seven-eighths of a mile distant, on which stood the Dunn House Battery and Fort Friend (see Pp. 51-52); and the Friend House hill, one mile and one-quarter distant, a little east of north. Both these hills were partly fortified, and artillery covered the rear and flanks.” General Tidball added that these works and others formed “an interior line for some distance in rear of the Stedman front, and then turning to the left, near the Jerusalem Plank Road, made a return line facing to the rear.”20

As Union Bvt. Maj. Gen. John F. Hartranft noted, Fort Stedman was strategically located: “Fort Stedman, with Batteries IX and X on its right and Batteries XI and XII and Fort Haskell on its left, covered Meade’s Station on the United States Military Railroad, the supply route of the army of the Potomac.” Meade’s Station (see Pg. 53), which lay only 2,200 yards to the rear, was the supply depot of the IX Corps. Seizure of the high ground between Fort Stedman and Meade’s Station would cut Grant’s long blue line in two, isolating the Union left and exposing it to being “rolled up” with a flanking attack.21

This concludes the excerpt. Click the link below to purchase the complete issue. Don't Forget! Each issue of Blue & Gray includes a detailed Driving Tour of the featured site!