The people of the State of Tennessee voted to secede from the Union and join the Confederacy effective June 8, 1861. Leaders from both sections of the country hoped Kentucky would side with them. Kentucky’s location with the Ohio River as a northern boundary meant she could greatly help North or South. Kentucky’s decision not to follow Tennessee out of the Union forced Southern leaders to defend the Tennessee border instead of the Ohio River line as they had hoped. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers crossed or touched the state’s border, and each river provided opportunity for Union invasion and a dependable enemy supply line.

During the summer of 1861 and early 1862, both sides were trying to ready themselves for the escalating war. The strategy for both North and South was to control the rivers and railroads. For the Union Army to prevail, armies had to be sent into Confederate territory. The Union Army faced the daunting task of invading, occupying, and controlling this vast area. In order to accomplish this task, large armies had to be trained, supplied, and moved into the South. Supply lines had to be developed and maintained. The ability to keep such an army supplied and reinforced was so critical that victory could not be achieved without the use of rivers and railroads. In order to open the important rivers, gunboats had to be converted from existing boats or built. While Northern efforts in building armies and gunboats were in progress, Southern efforts were concentrated on building armies and forts. The strategy of defending the borders to secure their new country required controlling these major transportation routes. In short, controlling the rivers and railroads would be vital for the success or failure of either army.

Governor Isham G. Harris of Tennessee, sympathetic to the Confederacy, decided to begin work on the defense of his state even before the vote for secession was cast. He dispatched civilian engineers to select sites for the forts envisioned on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. They were instructed to select sites north of railroad crossings and south of the Tennessee and Kentucky state line. The site chosen for the Cumberland River defense was on a bluff near Dover, Tennessee. A site for the Tennessee River fort was not so easy to locate. A bluff near the mouth of Standing Rock Creek was their recommendation. The engineers added that better sites were located in Kentucky, such as the Birmingham Narrows, where the rivers were only three miles apart, but that was outside their search area. After receiving these initial opinions, Governor Harris decided to get a military viewpoint. He sent Bushrod Johnson and Daniel S. Donelson to the area. They approved the Cumberland River fort site, which took the Donelson name. They did not like the Tennessee River location and recommended it be moved to Kirkland’s Landing. This site had existing roads connecting the two proposed fort locations, but it was in the Tennessee River flood plain. Still, Governor Harris followed their recommendations and had Fort Henry (named for Tennessee senator Gustavus A. Henry) built on low ground frequently flooded by the Tennessee River. The poor location eventually forced Confederate leaders to occupy and fortify high ground across the river from Fort Henry. This work was named Fort Heiman.

Work on the forts progressed very slowly. There were shortages of manpower and everything else needed at the forts. The command structure was not good and constantly changing. This made it difficult to inspire soldiers to work hard digging fort walls. Artillery officer Capt. Jesse Taylor was sent to the river forts to take command of the batteries. He was ordered to supervise the mounting of the heavy guns and to train gun crews. Captain Taylor did not like what he found, particularly at Fort Henry. He reported the poor location, noting that high-water marks were found above the fort, and heard statements from longtime residents that the fort would go under water with a normal spring rise.

While he had visited other major points in his command, Confederate Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, who was President Jefferson Davis’ choice to command the massive Department Number 2, had not visited Forts Henry and Donelson. The commanding general did receive reports filed on the river forts. When Captain Taylor’s report surfaced, Johnston sent his chief engineer, Capt. Joseph Dixon, to inspect the area. Dixon reported that Fort Henry was not in a favorable position, but too much work had been done to move it. He suggested mounting more guns and building outer works east of the fort to protect it from an infantry attack. Dixon may also have been the first officer to suggest building a small fort (Heiman) on the opposite bank to assist in Fort Henry’s defense.

Dixon found that Fort Donelson had even less work completed. He felt that a better site existed, but recommended that the site should not be abandoned and for the work to be pressed forward. Maj. Jeremy Gilmer, a West Point graduate, arrived in October 1861, and took over as chief engineer. He made his way to the Tennessee and Cumberland river defenses. He too saw the poor location chosen for Fort Henry, but agreed with Dixon that too much work had been completed to move the fort. He recommended increasing the number of guns in the battery. Moving to Fort Donelson, Gilmer found that very little progress had been made there. He wanted the guns more than doubled and field batteries sent as well. He also believed that the river should be obstructed to prevent or hinder the passage of enemy gunboats. After making these decisions, Gilmer rode off to plan for the defense of Clarksville and Nashville, leaving Dixon to complete the work.

Page 2 • Order this issue