Volume XXV Issue #5 • An Excerpt From:


The Real Battle of Fredericksburg
Stonewall Jackson, Prospect Hill,
and the Slaughter Pen

By Frank A. O'Reilly

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Note: All Blue & Gray feature articles are annotated.




Confederate Lt. Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker’s artillery position at Prospect Hill on the Fredericksburg, Va. battlefield.



The Battle of Fredericksburg seems to have been misplaced by history. Memory focuses attention on the waves of forlorn Union attackers, bludgeoning themselves uselessly against the impregnable Marye’s Heights and its terrible Stone Wall. While sensationalistic and sobering, it lacks context. Nothing done in front of the Stone Wall or atop Marye’s Heights altered the outcome of a battle that already had been determined several miles south of Fredericksburg—at Prospect Hill and an open floodplain soon to be christened the Slaughter Pen. In purely military terms, the Battle of Fredericksburg was fought between the Union Left Grand Division, under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, and the Confederate Second Corps, under Lt. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson.

Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside had assumed command of the Union Army of the Potomac in November 1862, and quickly put it on the road to Richmond, the Confederate capital, by way of Fredericksburg. The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad featured prominently in his calculations for succoring a winter campaign in Virginia. The railroad could provide his army with vital supplies and reinforcements regardless of unpredictable weather at that advanced season. Burnside attempted to seize the city of Fredericksburg before the Confederates could oppose him; however, his army foundered on the banks of the Rappahannock River. Bureaucratic ineptitude deprived the Union force of a much needed pontoon bridge train that Burnside had requested, so he could cross the river without delay. Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee took advantage of Burnside’s inertia to concentrate his Army of Northern Virginia around Fredericksburg. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s First Corps occupied the Rappahannock Valley on November 22, and Lt. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Second Corps was en route from the Shenandoah Valley. If Burnside intended to press on to Richmond, he would encounter resistance, starting right at the Rappahannock.

The Union army felt considerable political pressure to press ahead with the winter campaign regardless of the setback. Burnside also wanted to move before the Confederates concentrated all of their strength against him. Northern engineers scoured the river above and below Fredericksburg searching for every likely crossing point available. They considered a promising spot below the city called Skinker’s Neck. Capt. Wesley Brainerd of the 50th New York Engineers stole across the Rappahannock in the dead of night on November 26 to reconnoiter the Confederate side of the stream. He found the ground ideal for crossing a large army. Union artillery could set up on three sides of the neck to cover the passage, and the ground was firm and easily traversed. Best of all the Confederates had neglected to guard it. Burnside listened to Brainerd’s report and determined to seize Skinker’s Neck on December 6. The Army of the Potomac mobilized early and started marching. Snow and sleet quickly paralyzed the move, a forceful reminder of the vagaries of winter campaigning for 19th century armies. Worse news followed. Stonewall Jackson had arrived on the Rappahannock on December 3, and occupied the heights behind Skinker’s Neck. Burnside had no choice but to cancel his offensive and return his frosted troops to camp. Burnside’s attempt to turn the Confederates’ position before Lee could mass his army had failed. Whatever Burnside attempted to do now, it would be twice as hard.1

Exasperated, the Federal commander turned his attention back to Fredericksburg. He informed President Lincoln that forcing a difficult crossing at the city would be unexpected by the Confederates (ostensibly because it was so difficult). Union engineers pinpointed three crossing points opposite and below Fredericksburg, which they designated the Upper, Middle, and Lower Pontoon Crossings. The military action below the city had very little interaction with the events tied to Fredericksburg and Marye’s Heights. The Upper and Middle crossings were examined in the previous issue of Blue & Gray. This article will look at the events at the Lower Pontoon Crossing and the fields and ridges below the city of Fredericksburg.

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