Volume XXIII Issue #1 • An Excerpt From:

Gettysburg

A Collection of Articles by Gettysburg Historians

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open field that would be a dangerous approach for a mounted assault, but to their left (east of the plateau) was a deep ravine running north to south. The ravine offered a partially protected passage because the Rebel artillerymen could not depress their cannons low enough to fire into it. While Graham’s Union artillery on Wintrode Ridge a half-mile to the south kept Law’s cannons engaged, Kilpatrick believed Farnsworth’s men could charge through the ravine and attack the Confederate guns.17

Kilpatrick’s Two-Pronged
Frontal Assault Plan

Although Kilpatrick gets his share of negative press in Civil War literature today, his superiors were generally pleased with his ability to formulate an attack plan. Union Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard summed up the opinion saying Kilpatrick “organized carefully as he approached the enemy. . . .” At Gettysburg it was likely no different.18

Kilpatrick’s apparent plan was for Farnsworth’s brigade to perform a two-pronged frontal assault. In execution, Kilpatrick’s plan, like so many others, fell apart, making it difficult to understand his intent. The first prong of the plan consisted of a direct attack against the batteries. The most veteran unit in the brigade, the 1st West Virginia Cavalry (458 men) was chosen for that task. According to regimental historian Theodore Lang, the 1st West Virginia had been outfitted with Spencer rifles in the spring of 1863 which made it the likely choice for the direct attack. The largest regiment in the brigade, the 1st Vermont Cavalry (730 men) operated in three battalions of four companies each. Maj. William Wells’ battalion of the 1st Vermont (230 men) would ride to the right of the West Virginians. The 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry (508 men) formed on the left of the brigade; it would charge in support of the direct attack. The attacking column was to emerge near the northern end of the ravine about 50 yards in front of the Confederate guns and sweep to the left in a common counter-clockwise maneuver. The cavalry would have the advantage of surprise, and the Confederate artillerymen would have little time to react.19

The second prong of the assault consisted of a flanking maneuver. In addition to the direct threat, Capt. Henry Parsons’ battalion of the 1st Vermont Cavalry (259 men) would try to outflank the batteries to keep the enemy from withdrawing the guns and to cause more disruption behind the Confederate lines. The remaining battalion of the 1st Vermont Cavalry (235 men), led by regimental commander Lt. Col. Addison Preston, was dismounted on the skirmish line. The assault would also have artillery support. Graham’s battery would continue to engage Reilly from the south while Elder’s guns were dragged to the crest of Bushman Hill. Elder would have at least one section (two guns) pointing toward Big Round Top to fire on any Confederate regiments that about-faced to intercept the cavalry. The 5th New York Cavalry (427 men) supported Elder’s battery. From Bushman Hill, the brigade line extended to the southwest to near the Emmitsburg Road, where the extreme left, held by the 18th Pennsylvania, connected with the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry of Merritt’s brigade.20

By 4:30 the stage was set. Having made all the necessary preparations, Kilpatrick took a position at “Potter’s Rocks,” an outcropping of boulders in the woods to the east of the ravine where he could view the position better. All was in order except that Farnsworth had no confidence that the plan would succeed. He believed such an attack would be disastrous for his brigade and he said so. After considering every option available to him, Kilpatrick thought his plan was the best alternative under the circumstances and was better than doing nothing. Lt. Eli Holden of Kilpatrick’s staff wrote, “Kilpatrick did not claim [his plan] would result in any success,” only that it was “the only method left to execute his orders.” Meanwhile, Farnsworth’ men and horses waited impatiently in the woods.21

On the main battlefield, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s Confederate assault (Pickett’s Charge) on Cemetery Ridge was repulsed and Union commander Maj. Gen. George G. Meade rode to Little Round Top to mobilize the V and VI Corps. “As soon as [Longstreet’s] . . . assault was repulsed,” Meade testified in 1864 before the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, “I went immediately to the extreme left of my line with the determination of advancing the left and making an assault upon the enemy’s lines.” The Cavalry Corps commander, General Pleasonton, was with Meade as he made preparations for his counterattack. At the same time, Pleasonton sent orders to Kilpatrick to make “the strongest diversion possible in preparation for an infantry advance.” The Union cavalry was deployed at precisely the right place to threaten the Confederate rear and create a diversion to weaken any resistance to Meade’s counterattack.22

Kilpatrick received Pleasonton’s order to “create a strong diversion” at about 5:00 p.m. The time had come for action and he was prepared. He gave Farnsworth the order to execute the planned attack. Farnsworth took his position at the head of the main column and prepared to lead his men in what he believed would be a disastrous charge. A Vermont officer wrote, “The general and his troopers understood they were to draw the enemy’s fire, to create a diversion preparatory to the main movement.” As the officers shouted “Draw sabers!” each man tightened his grip on the reins, and at the command nudged his horse forward. With heightened awareness in the crucible of battle, “away, into the jaws of death and into the mouth of hell rode that splendid body of brave men.”23