In the late afternoon of September 19, Price and Rosecrans fought a desperate and bloody engagement at Iuka. A phenomenon known as “acoustic shadow” combined with a steady wind from the northwest prevented Ord from hearing the action. Unaware of the fighting to the southwest, Ord’s men never engaged the portion of Price’s troops posted in a defensive position to the north of town. The distance between the two Union forces was only a few miles but the difficult terrain in the area required messengers to follow a circuitous route that took hours to traverse. By the time Ord learned of the fighting, night had fallen and the engagement was over. The pincer movement envisioned by Grant did not develop and Price’s army escaped from Iuka on an unguarded road.4

Narrowly escaping the Federal trap, Price drew his army off to Baldwyn, Mississippi, and on September 28 made the long anticipated junction with Van Dorn in Ripley. Van Dorn, being the senior officer, took command of the combined force of 22,000 men and christened his command the Army of West Tennessee. This was not the first time the two men had served together. In early March 1862, the duo had squared off against a Federal army led by Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis and were delivered a decisive defeat at the Battle of Pea Ridge (Elkhorn Tavern) in Arkansas.5

Earl Van Dorn, West Point class of 1842, was the quintessential cavalryman of the pre-war army. Five feet eight inches in height, slight of build and ruggedly handsome, he carried a reputation that heralded a promising career. He served with distinction in the war with Mexico as an officer in the 7th U.S. Infantry, earning brevet promotions to captain and major. In 1855 he accepted a captaincy in the vaunted 2nd U.S. Cavalry, serving with a veritable who’s who of Civil War figures, including Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, William J. Hardee, George H. Thomas, and John B. Hood. Van Dorn was nearly killed three years later by a Comanche arrow while in command at the Battle of Wichita Village.6

Sterling Price, known as “Old Pap” to his men, was a politically appointed general with some minor combat experience in the Mexican War, where he commanded a regiment of Missouri volunteers. Prior to the Civil War he had served as a legislator, senator and governor and was devoted to his men and the State of Missouri. Together Van Dorn and Price laid down a plan to re-take West Tennessee and drive the Union forces under Grant to the Ohio River.7

In order to begin an offensive into West Tennessee and maintain a supply route back to Mississippi, the two men agreed they first had to neutralize the Union garrison at Corinth. The small Mississippi town lay at the junction of the Memphis & Charleston and Mobile & Ohio railroads, the possession of this vital crossroads being the foundation for the Siege of Corinth the previous May. With the strategic rail crossing back in Southern hands, the army could then move northward, flanking the enemy out of their defensive positions in Tennessee at Bolivar and Memphis. The plan was exceedingly bold considering Grant’s forces were almost double those of his foe. Van Dorn’s plan required him to strike and move quickly, never allowing the enemy to know his location or intentions. In theory, Grant would be too confused to determine where the Confederates would strike next, and thus would be unable to mass his troops efficiently. This would allow Van Dorn to defeat Grant in detail, forcing him from one position after the other. The first step would be a successful attack on Corinth.8

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