Sending his cavalry racing ahead of the main column, Hovey’s horse soldiers (led by Brig. Gen. Cadwallader C. Washburn) reached the railroads on the 30th and proceeded to cut telegraph lines, tear up tracks, and wreck a small bridge on each line. Although the damage was superficial, the threat to his left flank and rear, especially his lines of supply and communications, compelled Pemberton (left) to abandon his strong defense line along the Tallahatchie. The Confederate commander pulled his forces 50 miles farther south to Grenada and ordered his troops to construct a new line of defense overlooking the Yalobusha River.

Grant’s soldiers bridged the Tallahatchie in early December and continued the drive (see Map, Pg. 10). Rain, however, fell in torrents and turned the roads into ribbons of mud in which the troops sank to their knees and wagons were mired axle deep. The men were forced in places to corduroy the roads and, with painful exertion, slogged their way through Abbeville to Oxford. Establishing his headquarters in Oxford on December 4, the Union commander sent only a portion of his command farther south in pursuit. These troops clashed with the Confederate rear guard near Coffeeville the following day and were dealt a severe repulse. By late afternoon on December 7, as Grant consolidated his forces in and around Oxford, including on the grounds of the University of Mississippi, Pemberton had successfully withdrawn his army across the rain-swollen Yalobusha River and was constructing another formidable line of defense to contest the Federal offensive.

While Grant waited in Oxford for Sherman’s troops to arrive and for Federal engineers to repair the damage to the railroad in his rear, he assessed the situation and contemplated his next move. Clearly, as the Confederates had won the race to the Yalobusha and were establishing a strong line of fortifications overlooking the river, it would be dangerous to push farther south unless heavily reinforced. Further troubling Grant was his ever-lengthening supply and communications line that stretched by rail back to Columbus, Kentucky. Despite establishing an advance base at Holly Springs and stationing troops at key points for protection, the Union lifeline was vulnerable and became more dangerously exposed with every mile Grant’s soldiers pushed southward.

More disturbing to Grant was word that Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand (right) had been authorized by the president to raise an independent command for operations along the Mississippi River aimed at Vicksburg. In fact, at that very moment, McClernand was directing freshly recruited units from the Old Northwest to the staging area at Memphis. Grant later wrote, “Two commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in this case I did not think the general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a position. I feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust.”12

Embroiled in controversy throughout much of his military career, John A. McClernand remains a shadowy figure around whom controversy still swirls. Energetic, aggressive, and ambitious, he was also bombastic, egotistical, and irritating to those around him. The general had piercing eyes, a hearty laugh, and an engaging smile, yet at all times was calculating and deceitful—traits that hindered him from working in tandem with others. A troublesome subordinate, McClernand has been characterized by his more famous contemporaries as inept, incompetent, and insubordinate.

Yet, the former Democratic member of Congress had demonstrated great personal bravery on many hard-fought fields. Through experience gained in heavy fighting at Belmont, Ft. Donelson, and Shiloh he had evolved into a solid combat officer who earned frequent commendation—and headlines too. But despite the acclaim he received, McClernand rankled under the harness imposed by subordination to Grant and others whom, he felt, treated him unfairly while showing favoritism to West Pointers. McClernand yearned for an independent command and wrote letters to both Lincoln and his political ally Gov. Richard Yates of Illinois for assistance.

At the request of Governor Yates, McClernand was sent home to Illinois in mid-August 1862 to raise troops in Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa—a role in which he was highly successful. McClernand seized upon his popularity and traveled to Washington in search of greater opportunity for political gain following the Battle of Antietam in September. Accompanying the president to the battlefield near Sharpsburg, Maryland, he played a subversive role in the army seeking to supplant Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan in the East and criticized Grant’s operations in the West for his failure to pursue the enemy after Shiloh. (Such criticism only worked to widen the rift between McClernand and Grant.) Although he failed to gain command in the East, McClernand did receive authorization from President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton to raise and command a force for operations on the Mississippi River aimed at Vicksburg.

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