After the brief conversation with Major Lee, Polk headed for the front line with his escort. Seeing the courier to Hill, Private Fisher, warming his hands at a fire, the escort commander called Fisher to account for his activities on the previous evening. Finding the hapless private’s explanation satisfactory but unfortunate, Polk resumed his trek out of the creek bottom in search of Harvey Hill. Captain Wheless, meanwhile, had at last found Hill, in the company of Cleburne and Breckinridge, standing around a fire in the midst of the wreckage of Battery A, 1st Michigan Light Artillery on the north edge of George Winfrey’s field. When Hill reached for the proffered orders, Wheless officiously handed them to the division commanders and justified his conduct by explaining Polk’s unsuccessful efforts to locate Hill earlier. Cleburne and Breckinridge quickly passed the orders to Hill, and one of them (probably Breckinridge) stated that his men could not attack until they had received their rations. Anxious to return to Polk, Captain Wheless asked Hill if he desired to send a message to the wing commander. Hill responded affirmatively, then casually spent ten minutes drafting a note while Wheless chaffed at the delay. The message finished at last, Wheless galloped away in search of Polk. He soon met Capt. Minick Williams, another of Polk’s staff officers, coming forward with duplicate orders. Sending Williams to Cheatham with word that the attack would be delayed, Wheless resumed his ride. He next encountered Polk himself, at the junction of the Jay’s Mill and Alexander’s Bridge roads. Giving Polk Hill’s note, Wheless volunteered the information that in his opinion Hill’s estimate of an hour’s delay was wildly optimistic. Ordering Wheless to establish Right Wing headquarters at the spot, Polk departed in search of Hill.3

Upon reaching Hill’s location, Polk listened as Hill recounted a litany of reasons why he could not commence the attack just yet. First, the men were in the midst of receiving rations, and some of them had been hungry for a long time. Second, there was a misalignment between some of Cleburne’s men and John Jackson’s brigade of Cheatham’s Division. Third, there had been no reconnaissance of the Federal position, especially its flank. Fourth, there was no cavalry on Hill’s right to guard his flank, and no reserves identified to reinforce success or mitigate failure. Furiously attempting to conceal his own culpability in the delay, Hill ascribed several of the problems he identified to levels higher than himself, including the army commander. Rather than seize the moment to take corrective action, Polk reluctantly acquiesced in a delay of indeterminate length, to be controlled by Hill. Thus the entire Army of Tennessee would mark time until Harvey Hill was ready to begin his advance. As the fog began to burn away and the ringing of axes could be heard from the Federal line, Polk rode to the rear. He soon met Braxton Bragg, who came forward himself after hearing Major Lee’s dismissive account of Polk’s activities. Before meeting Polk, Bragg had already come upon Captain Wheless, who had defended his chief and spoken disparagingly of Hill. The conversation between Bragg and Polk is unrecorded in detail, but Bragg later wrote that he reconfirmed the attack order. Overtly or not, he also acquiesced in the delay in the timing of the attack. Again, the Army of Tennessee would wait upon Harvey Hill’s pleasure. According to Hill, Bragg visited him after leaving Polk, but this meeting must have been brief, given Bragg’s antipathy toward Hill. After the other generals departed, and while his troops were eating, Hill finally made a reconnaissance of his right and front with Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest.4

Perfectly unaware of the confusion within the ranks of the Confederate command structure, Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans also rose early on the fog-shrouded morning of September 20. Around 6:00 a.m., he came out of the Widow Glenn cabin and began a horseback survey of his line of battle. A private soldier in Brig. Gen. William H. Lytle’s brigade who saw him at that time noted that Rosecrans looked haggard but still exuded confidence and resolve. Beginning in the vicinity of the Glenn Cabin before moving north, Rosecrans found that Maj. Gen. Alexander McCook’s XX Corps was not arranged according to his desires. Having lost a division attached to the XIV Corps on the previous day and with a brigade absent guarding the army’s trains on Lookout Mountain, McCook had only five brigades available for deployment. Accordingly, he had consolidated Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan’s Third Division (three brigades) around the Glenn Cabin and the ridge trending north from it, leaving the territory stretching from Lee and Gordon’s Mills to the Viniard Farm in the hands of the Federal cavalry. He had placed Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’ two battered brigades on the rising ground west of the Dry Valley Road to Sheridan’s left rear, where they connected to no one. McCook’s right flank was guarded by Col. John T. Wilder’s mounted infantry brigade, in position on the same rising ground west of the Dry Valley Road approximately 500 yards south of the Glenn Cabin. Unsatisfied with McCook’s arrangements, Rosecrans directed that Davis’ men be moved to a position on Sheridan’s left. He then rode north with his chief of staff, James Garfield, and several other staff officers. Finding Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden’s XXI Corps (only five brigades strong because of previous detachments) also resting at the foot of the hill west of the Dry Valley Road, Rosecrans directed that it be moved farther north.5

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