Volume XXIV Issue #6 • An Excerpt From:

The Chickamauga Campaign:
The Battle of Chickamauga
Day 1, September 19, 1863

By William Glenn Robertson

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Union position at Viniard Field on the Chickamauaga battlefield.



After an arduous campaign lasting 21 days in the fall of 1863, the Federal Army of the Cumberland and the Confederate Army of Tennessee had at last come within striking distance of each other. Major rivers had been crossed, high mountain ranges had been surmounted, the city of Chattanooga, Tennessee had changed hands, but the armies had not yet clashed. Nevertheless, by the evening of September 18, more than 120,000 troops were finally on the verge of a major battle. Gen. Braxton Bragg, commander of the Confederate Army of Tennessee, had been trying to initiate such a battle for more than a week. His latest plan envisioned moving north beyond the Federal left flank, forcing his way across Chickamauga Creek, which separated the two armies, and driving the Army of the Cumberland southward into McLemore’s Cove and away from Chattanooga. Bragg expected the fight to begin on September 19 near Lee and Gordon’s Mills, where the road between Rossville and La Fayette, Georgia crossed the creek and where he placed the Federal left flank. All had not gone according to plan on September 18, but by the end of the day significant portions of his army had gained the west bank of the Chickamauga successfully. When joined by the remainder, Bragg’s forces would push southward and crush the unsuspecting Federal left. West of the creek, Bragg’s counterpart Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, hoped that the day of reckoning could be postponed a bit. Although a Federal brigade had held Chattanooga for ten days, most of Rosecrans’ units were still scrambling to concentrate after their wide-front advance through the north Georgia mountains. Until that concentration was complete, Rosecrans did not desire to fight a major battle. Seeing undisputable evidence on the 18th that the Confederates were turning his left, Rosecrans had sent Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas’ XIV Corps on a night march to extend his army’s vulnerable left flank far beyond Lee and Gordon’s Mills. Perhaps, Rosecrans hoped, that move would protect his forces sufficiently until their concentration was complete.1

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