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Lee and Gordon's Mills was a Union position at the time of the events described in this issue.
If Bragg (left) expected Polk to act expeditiously, he was sorely mistaken. Although Cheatham’s Division had made only a leisurely march on the previous day and a warning order for movement had been in effect since midnight, Polk did not issue direct instructions to Cheatham until 9:30 a.m. At least one brigade, Otho F. Strahl’s, did not leave its camps until 10:00 a.m. Polk himself did not ride for Rock Spring Church until 4:00 p.m. and took two hours to get there. Maj. Gen. William H. T. Walker’s Reserve Corps, consisting of his own and St. John R. Liddell’s divisions, departed for Rock Spring some time after Cheatham, but at least they had the excuse of being at Dug Gap the previous day. Thus the road north was filled all day with marching troops, who raised a huge dust plume seen far and wide. The Confederates tramping toward Rock Spring did not yet include Hindman’s Division. At 1:30 p.m. Polk ordered Hindman to have his men cook three days’ rations and “refresh” before setting out for Rock Spring as well. Those two processes took well into the evening, and Hindman’s command was still in the vicinity of La Fayette at 10:30 p.m. on the 12th. Meanwhile, Bragg received reports from his cavalry screen indicating Federal movement across his front from east to west. In late afternoon John Pegram reported that he had been driven back by elements of John T. Wilder’s mounted infantry brigade and John M. Palmer’s infantry division. At 6:00 p.m. Bragg dispatched a message to Polk reporting that information and directing the corps commander to attack at dawn. If those Federal elements could be destroyed, Bragg could fall on the remainder of the XXI Corps and destroy it too. McLemore’s Cove may have been a failure, but amazingly, in Bragg’s estimation, a similar opportunity was now presenting itself.2
Once again, while Bragg plotted the destruction of one of Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans’ (left) major elements, that officer remained convinced that he could still retain the initiative. When the first news of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas’ check at Davis Crossroads in McLemore’s Cove arrived the previous night, Rosecrans and his staff assumed that Bragg was finally making a firm stand, but by late morning on September 12 the army high command, now including Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana, had come to think otherwise. The withdrawal of the Confederate force from McLemore’s Cove the night of September 11-12 was now seen as a temporary measure designed only to check pursuit while the retreat to Rome, Ga., continued. If that were true, the Federals must concentrate quickly to attack the Army of Tennessee before it escaped. Rising earlier than his norm but later than some might feel prudent, Rosecrans began to issue instructions to his scattered corps at 10:30 a.m. First went a message to Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, which explained Thomas’ momentary delay and ordered the XX Corps commander to move to Thomas’ support with two divisions, leaving one division on Lookout Mountain with his trains. Forty-five minutes later, Rosecrans dispatched orders to Thomas. Gratuitously characterizing James Negley’s withdrawal of his division from McLemore’s Cove on September 11 as one of “prudence,” not “necessity,” Rosecrans ordered Thomas to contact McCook, who would be marching to join him. He further told the XIV Corps commander (Thomas) that Crittenden would soon be at Lee and Gordon’s Mills with the consolidated XXI Corps and would attack the Confederate flank. Rosecrans would be managing Crittenden’s attack himself, but he needed information from Thomas in order to do so. If all moved quickly, the Confederate army could yet be brought to battle before it escaped southward. Just to be sure of overwhelming force in the forthcoming “general battle,” Rosecrans telegraphed Gordon Granger at Bridgeport, Ala., to come to Chattanooga, bringing along three Reserve Corps brigades plus John King’s brigade of Absalom Baird’s division.3
Once again, while Bragg plotted the destruction of one of Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans’ (left) major elements, that officer remained convinced that he could still retain the initiative. When the first news of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas’ check at Davis Crossroads in McLemore’s Cove arrived the previous night, Rosecrans and his staff assumed that Bragg was finally making a firm stand, but by late morning on September 12 the army high command, now including Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana, had come to think otherwise. The withdrawal of the Confederate force from McLemore’s Cove the night of September 11-12 was now seen as a temporary measure designed only to check pursuit while the retreat to Rome, Ga., continued. If that were true, the Federals must concentrate quickly to attack the Army of Tennessee before it escaped. Rising earlier than his norm but later than some might feel prudent, Rosecrans began to issue instructions to his scattered corps at 10:30 a.m. First went a message to Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, which explained Thomas’ momentary delay and ordered the XX Corps commander to move to Thomas’ support with two divisions, leaving one division on Lookout Mountain with his trains. Forty-five minutes later, Rosecrans dispatched orders to Thomas. Gratuitously characterizing James Negley’s withdrawal of his division from McLemore’s Cove on September 11 as one of “prudence,” not “necessity,” Rosecrans ordered Thomas to contact McCook, who would be marching to join him. He further told the XIV Corps commander (Thomas) that Crittenden would soon be at Lee and Gordon’s Mills with the consolidated XXI Corps and would attack the Confederate flank. Rosecrans would be managing Crittenden’s attack himself, but he needed information from Thomas in order to do so. If all moved quickly, the Confederate army could yet be brought to battle before it escaped southward. Just to be sure of overwhelming force in the forthcoming “general battle,” Rosecrans telegraphed Gordon Granger at Bridgeport, Ala., to come to Chattanooga, bringing along three Reserve Corps brigades plus John King’s brigade of Absalom Baird’s division.3