Editor’s note: The Fall 2006 issue featured the opening of the Chickamauga Campaign and concluded with the capture of Chattanooga by Union forces under General William S. Rosecrans on September 9, 1863. It was the first in a multiple-issue treatment to conclude in 2008, the 145th Anniversary year of this important campaign and battle. Three maps from the Fall 2006 issue showing the developing situation on September 7-9, 1863, appear on Pp. 11-13 of this issue to help set the stage for Part 2 of the Chickamauga Campaign series.
The transfer of significant numbers of troops from the Army of Northern Virginia to the Army of Tennessee was not a new idea. It had been suggested by a variety of people since 1862, particularly when the situation looked bleak in Tennessee. Currently its chief proponents were James Longstreet, and those, like Senator Louis T. Wigfall of Texas, who supported him. Longstreet’s motives were complex, but a dispassionate reading of his correspondence on the subject yields several key threads. First, he desired a larger role for himself in the conflict, which he did not see occurring as long as he remained with the Army of Northern Virginia. Second, he was contemptuous of Braxton Bragg and Bragg’s ability to succeed in the Western Theater. Third, he was displeased at the results of the Battle of Gettysburg and the conduct of that battle by Robert E. Lee. Thus Longstreet proposed to lead a contingent of reinforcements from Lee’s army to join the Army of Tennessee, where he would replace Bragg, with Bragg perhaps taking Longstreet’s old command in Virginia. All this was cloaked in the most high-minded rhetoric, couched in terms of a simple desire to aid the Cause and serve once more as a subordinate to Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. With Johnston currently acting only in the role of distant advisor to the essentially independent Army of Tennessee, the latter statement was especially self-serving. Longstreet had proposed such a movement as early as January and again in May, but his advice had been gently rejected both times. In August, as the Confederate situation in Tennessee deteriorated and Longstreet’s Gettysburg unhappiness festered, he tried again, writing letters to both Senator Wigfall and Secretary of War James A. Seddon. In each case, the prescription was the same: send reinforcements from Virginia to the Army of Tennessee with James Longstreet at their head.2
Longstreet’s August campaign for a change came at an especially propitious time. On August 24, Jefferson Davis called Robert E. Lee to Richmond for a series of discussions about Confederate strategy. Initially the talks hinged around the Army of Northern Virginia once more taking the offensive in its own area of operations, and Lee sent preliminary orders to Longstreet to that effect on August 31. Longstreet responded two days later, again reiterating his preference for a western initiative. Unknown to Longstreet, the continuing Davis-Lee discussions were taking a turn in his favor, possibly because of the involvement of Secretary of War Seddon. Longstreet had worked long and hard to sell his scheme to Seddon, and on September 3, Seddon gave Davis a communication from Senator Gustavus A. Henry of Tennessee specifically calling for Longstreet to lead a contingent to reinforce Bragg’s army. Just how the transformation came about is unknown, but on September 4, Lee asked Longstreet for movement times and troop numbers for just such a program as Longstreet had favored. The corps commander’s response was revealing. Claiming an inability to furnish the data Lee requested, he nevertheless continued to argue vigorously for his proposal, going so far as to offer to lead a much smaller contingent gathered from a variety of sources. Clearly, Longstreet’s goal was to get himself to Tennessee, and if his original numbers were a problem, they could be changed. Even as Longstreet responded to Lee on September 5, Davis had reached his decision: two divisions from Longstreet’s First Corps would be sent west. The Confederate President desired that Robert E. Lee go with them, but when Lee demurred, Davis did not press the issue. James Longstreet would at last get his ticket out of Virginia.3
Once the momentous decision was made, the operation was placed in the hands of planners associated with the Confederate Quartermaster General, Alexander R. Lawton. Principal among these was Maj. Frederick W. Sims, chief and virtually sole employee of the Railroad Bureau. Sims’ initial planning estimates involved transporting up to 20,000 troops and 50 artillery pieces to Chattanooga via the direct route through Lynchburg and Bristol in Virginia, and Knoxville in Tennessee. A distance of 540 miles, that route involved the use of five different companies beyond Richmond (see Map, Pg. 9): the Richmond & Danville to Burkeville (Va.); the South Side to Lynchburg; the Virginia & Tennessee to Bristol; the East Tennessee & Virginia to Knoxville; and the East Tennessee & Georgia to Chattanooga. All of these railroads were five-foot gauge, reducing the need for troop transfers at intermediate points. Hardly had the detailed planning begun when word arrived on September 8 that Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside’s advance into East Tennessee had captured Knoxville, severing the direct railroad path to Chattanooga. Planning now began anew, but this time the route was much longer and more complex. Instead of five railroads beyond Richmond, the amended plan called for the use of up to 14 companies. Beyond Weldon, N.C., two alternate routings were available: one via Charlotte, N.C., Columbia, S.C., and Augusta, Ga., and the other via Wilmington, N.C., Charleston, S.C., and Savannah, Ga. Either way, the miles traveled would approach 900, and gauge differences would multiply transfer points. Nevertheless, on September 7, the first units began to move toward the tracks. By the end of September 9, the railhead at Hanover Junction, Va., was crowded with troops awaiting trains, and the leading elements of Henry Benning’s brigade had reached Raleigh, N.C.4
