Continued

Wartime Chattanooga viewed from the north side of the Tennessee River.


necessity to sustain a large army in the same inhospitable terrain. As for the terrain itself, a quick glance at a map (see Pp. 10-11) would show that the fertile rolling farmland of Middle Tennessee was separated from Chattanooga by a series of long mountain ridges running generally from northeast to southwest. Winding among those ridges and indeed cutting through them occasionally was the Tennessee River, one of eastern America’s greatest streams. Any army attempting to move from Middle Tennessee to Chattanooga would first have to surmount the Cumberland Plateau, then descend to the long valley jointly formed by the Tennessee and its tributary the Sequatchie River. If Chattanooga were to be approached from the north, another mountain, Walden’s Ridge, would have to be crossed, then the Tennessee River itself. On the other hand, if Chattanooga were to be approached from the south, the order of major obstacles would be: Tennessee River, Sand Mountain (the southern equivalent of Walden’s Ridge), and finally Lookout Mountain, tallest of all the parallel ridges at 2,200 feet above sea level. Simply to move an army over such mountains and across such a wide river would be a Herculean task.7

Granted that an army could physically move over such barriers successfully using only horse, mule, and foot power, there was still the problem of sustainment in such a hostile environment. Farms and, indeed, inhabitants were scarce in the mountains and could provide little sustenance even if their owners were so inclined toward Rosecrans’ hungry army. If the final moves were delayed until the corn was ripe in late summer and early fall, everything else still would have to be provided from quartermaster and commissary depots far in the Federal rear. Either the army would have to depend upon thousands of wagons, whose mules would have to carry their own food and thereby reduce the wagons’ carrying capacity, or turn the existing single-track Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad into an efficient conduit for all manner of supplies. Given the fact that the Army of the Cumberland’s rear logistics base was Louisville, Ky., and its intermediate base was Nashville, the use of railroad transportation as far forward as possible seemed to be the only feasible option. From Louisville south to Nashville the track was owned by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, a private concern. From Nashville, the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, now operated by the Army of the Cumberland, slanted southeast, crossing the Duck and Elk Rivers and tunneling through the Cumberland Plateau to Stevenson, Ala. It then turned northeast to Bridgeport, where it leaped the Tennessee River on a massive truss bridge. Retreating Confed-erates had destroyed major bridges over the Elk and Tennessee Rivers, but they had not damaged the 2,228-foot Cumberland Plateau tunnel near Cowan, Tenn. Although the Nashville & Chattanooga’s capacity was limited, it could sustain the Army of the Cumberland in its campaign if the Elk River Bridge and several smaller structures were rebuilt and time was taken to accumulate a supply reserve.8

Acutely aware of those physical realities, Rosecrans had formulated his campaign plan with them in mind. First came the rebuilding of the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad as far forward as possible. As soon as the Confederates passed beyond the Cumberland Plateau, Rosecrans dispatched his best engineer unit, Col. William P. Innes’ 1st Regiment Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, to rebuild the 450-foot Elk River Bridge (see Pg. 63) located northwest of Decherd, Tenn. Innes’ men labored quickly and by July 25 had not only rebuilt that bridge, but had repaired the railroad all the way to Stevenson and Bridgeport.

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