Continued

his views frequently through violent outbursts of temper and vitriol. Simple of outlook, he was neither introspective nor an astute judge of character. Utterly convinced of the correctness of his own views, Rosecrans was often self-righteous in the extreme. He could relate to other people in a superficial way, but he had no deep understanding of their thoughts and motives for acting, and desired none. People important to his career, like U. S. Grant and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, detested Rosecrans, but he either was unaware of their enmity or cavalierly disregarded it.4

The staff Rosecrans had gathered about him to assist in directing the Army of the Cumberland was headed by Brig. Gen. James A. Garfield (left). Gaining the position less than a month after the death of his predecessor, Julius Garesche, at Stones River, Garfield had already been elected to the national House of Representatives. Though he regarded the staff position as temporary until he could take his seat in Congress in the fall, Garfield moved quickly to gain ascendancy as Rosecrans’ principal advisor and primary coordinator of the army’s business in both camp and field. Strongly religious, though not a Roman Catholic, Garfield had many of the same personal characteristics as his chief. As events would prove, however, he lacked loyalty, a trait Rosecrans possessed to a fault. Beyond Garfield, Rosecrans surrounded himself with a large number of young officers who varied widely in technical competence but excelled in making army headquarters a convivial place. Indeed, there were those who looked askance at the atmosphere surrounding Rosecrans’ inner circle, portraying it as unsavory and unprofessional. Most notable among the various staff officers were Maj. Frank S. Bond, the senior aide-de-camp, and Capt. Horace Porter, the army’s ordnance officer. In garrison, the headquarters routine tended to be late to bed and late to rise, following the predilections of the army commander. Rosecrans liked nothing better than to keep his associates up far past midnight discussing some abstract point in religion, politics, or science. Nor was business divided hierarchically, as Rosecrans often immersed himself in the smallest details of administration or tactics.5

At the end of August 1863, the instrument that Rosecrans and his staff controlled numbered 80,425 officers and men present for duty and equipped, although the aggregate present on the same date was 95,905. At that time the Army of the Cumberland consisted of four infantry corps, a cavalry corps, and various engineer and reserve artillery units. The XIV Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, was the largest of the infantry formations, with 22,769 officers and men organized in four divisions. The XX Corps, led by Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, numbered 14,178 officers and men in three divisions. The XXI Corps, under Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, contained 13,958 officers and men, also organized in three divisions. Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger’s Reserve Corps consisted of 17,234 officers and men divided into three divisions. The Cavalry Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, added to the army’s total 10,209 officers and men organized in two divisions. Finally, 1,474 troops in the engineer and reserve artillery categories, as well as 1,021 men in Rosecrans’ headquarters and “palace guard” rounded out the Army of the Cumberland. Of the army’s senior leaders, all but Crittenden were West Point graduates. Rosecrans had served with all of them for some time and knew their strengths and weaknesses. He trusted Thomas implicitly, but was less sure of several of the others. In fact, Garfield had gently urged the replacement of McCook and Crittenden during the spring, but Rosecrans chose to leave them in place, no doubt because of their political and family connections.6

The campaign that Rosecrans initiated when his leading elements began to cross the Tennessee River on August 29 had been some time in maturation. Following the end of the Tullahoma Campaign on July 4, Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland paused for about six weeks to reorganize the command, rebuild the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, and make extensive preparations for the next move forward. Because his Confederate opponents had fully broken contact by withdrawing beyond the Tennessee River and several mountain ranges, Rosecrans reasoned that he would first have to surmount two other challenges before again coming to grips with his foe. Those two challenges were closely intertwined. The first difficulty was the extremely rough terrain that stood between the Federals and Chattanooga, which would have to be conquered by brute strength. The second difficulty was the

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